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Abstract 
The global financial crisis has taught the economies all over the world serious lessons. The aim is to assure a similarly tough 
crisis would not occur again. The paper focuses on the question whether stricter financial regulations are needed and how the 
global financial system can be reformed to become more resistant to shocks. Strengthening the financial regulation and the issue 
of financial stability have become a key public policy issue for economies with a significant role in reaching agreements between 
countries toward this direction. It is the G-20 economies and the IMF that are committed to maintaining financial stability and the 
transparency of the financial sector, which is likely to remain the source of economic crises. Nevertheless the trade-off between 
safety and economic growth has to be taken into account. This paper examines what has been achieved in the field of 
implementing regulatory reform steps and whether they provide protection to consumers and taxpayers as well as the 
preparedness of financial institutions when it comes to facing potential shocks. 
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Introduction 
Why should the global financial system be regulated? This paper addresses the topic of responsibility in the 
context of the global financial system and the desirability of stability. The collapse of Lehman Brothers on 
September 15, 2008 is regarded as the point when the „credit crunch” turned into a global financial crisis causing a 
multi-trillion dollar fall in the value of global bank assets over the following one year period. (IMF, Global Financial 
Stability Report, 2010). The topic is complex owing to the range of institutions covered, the breadth of instruments 
subject to regulation and cross border implications. It also includes the progress of financial regulation and the steps 
that have been made in order to make the system safer and more stable. Whether a regulated and more stable global 
financial system can better serve the real economy is a question. The global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-2008 has 
brought the need for financial regulation to the forefront. The necessity and importance of introducing certain 
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regulatory steps arose even before that due to the globalisation of finance, increase in trading in new derivative 
securities and financial innovation, which were represented by the profound changes in finance from the 1970s. The 
removal of capital controls contributed to the globalisation of financial systems, the change in behaviour of bankers 
from prudent intermediation to speculating on markets, innovations like algorithmic and high frequency trading and 
removal of derivatives from the scope of gaming laws made some regulatory steps inevitable. The regulation, 
however, did not successfully adapt to the spreading of the so called „market-based” businesses and could not keep 
up with the changes in the traditional banking activity meaning making profit on the difference of interest rates paid 
to savers and charged to loan- takers. The financial innovations included „exotic” securisations, non-bank financial 
intermediation, trading in derivatives. The following chapters give an overview of the factors that resulted in the 
GFC, the reform agenda subsequent to the crisis and an early assessment of the post-crisis reforms. It is the G-20, the 
group of finance ministers and central bank governors from 20 major economies (19 countries and the European 
Union), that transformed the Financial Stability Forum into the Financial Stability Board (FSB). The Financial 
Stability Forum (FSF) was set up in 1999 to promote international financial stability. The summits of the 20 major 
economies have proved a very effective way of reaching agreements between countries, the 2009 G-20 London 
summit decided to establish the FSB as the successor to the FSF. It is regarded as a response to the financial crisis 
since public wanted steps that assure a similarly serious crisis would not occur again. The FSB is accountable to the 
G-20 and provides a progress report before every meeting of their leaders. The financial sector is likely to remain the 
source of economic crises, which has brought the role of these economies in strengthening the financial regulation in 
the focus and the issue of financial stability became a key public policy issue for them. 
1. Material and Methods 
1.1. The cost of the regulatory reforms 
International management and tax consulting firms, equity and credit analysts and experts in the financial sector 
have assessed the cost impact of reforms. Ernst & Young suggests that reforms could significantly increase the cost 
of the industry. All European depositaries will be forced to hold additional capital against potential loss. The burdens 
are likely to be passed to investors and will have a strong impact on the European investment industry (Ernst 
&Young, 2012). The study of the Institute of International Finance provides a detailed analysis of the overall cost 
effects of the financial reforms. They predict that the price of credit in the US will be nearly 5 percentage points 
higher on average over the period of 2011-2015 as a result of new regulatory rules. They estimated that GDP in 
major economies would be approximately 3 per cent smaller in 2015 than they would be without the impacts of the 
post-crisis financial regulation. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) estimated that the Basel III 
capital and liquidity requirements would result in reducing the level of economic activity by 0.6 percent in total or 
0.08 percent annually if spread over the transition period of eight years (BCBS, 2010). Forbes Investor Team 
predicts that the implicit costs of regulation include generating negative economic outcomes and impair efficiency 
while new and more exotic products are likely to appear (Forbes Investor Team, 2012). 
1.2. The goals and areas of the regulatory reform program 
The main goal of the program is to make the global financial system more resilient to shocks through increasing 
the transparency of activities and managing the risks more appropriately. The desired stability requires enhancing 
preparedness of institutions and markets. Last but not least protection should be provided to consumers and 
taxpayers since it is not fair that failed institutions be resolved on taxpayers’ money in bailouts. A safer financial 
system is expected to minimise costs upon taxpayers and to provide better information and more accurate risk 
pricing including systemic ones. It is more transparent and less complex in which risk profile of investments can be 
understood better. It means more coordinated regulation and less systemic risk, less volatility through becoming less 
leveraged. A financial system is safer if there are normative benchmarks against which progress can be measured. 
Less systemic risk refers to less systemically risky linkage between the banking sector, non-banking sector and 
foreign banking sector, which limits contagion risk. It is important that prudential standards for similar risks be 
aligned better. The regulatory framework does not suggest that all recent innovation be abandoned in the global 
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financial sector. It rather suggests that the efficiency benefits of positive innovations like financial globalisation 
should be maintained. It proposes to give more clarity to the risk-profit trade-off when it comes to choosing between 
traditional and non-traditional models of intermediation. „Clear” products like corporate bonds and equities can 
promote credit and economic growth, meanwhile products such as subprime derivatives can lead to costly spillovers. 
Bailouts paid by taxpayers and disruptions in economies are not desirable. The paper provides a brief overview of 
the measures and steps of the program of financial sector reform while emphasizing the role and the responsibility of 
regulatory bodies and institutions. 
2. Results 
2.1. Strengthening capital adequacy rules: Basel III 
The Third Basel Accord is a global regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy, stress testing and market 
liquidity risk. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision agreed upon that in 2010-2011. The originally 
scheduled time of its introduction was extended from 2013-2015 to 2018-2019 as a result of an easing won by the 
global banking sector. The main goal of the Accord is to strengthen bank capital requirements, increasing bank 
liquidity and decreasing bank leverage. The GFC demonstrated that banks should hold significantly higher level of 
capital. According to the Basel III rule the banks are required to hold 4.5% of common equity and 6 % Tier I capital 
of risk-weighted assets (RWA) (Basel III Capital Rules) besides introducing additional capital buffers during periods 
of high credit. The presumed risk levels of the various assets are reflected by the ratio of capital to an adjusted size 
of total assets. The crisis also showed that risk-weightings were often too low compared to the actual risk of assets. 
Some types of assets were not suitable to protect banks such as subordinated debt, while some other types of assets 
were difficult to monetize so they were dropped from the definition of capital. The banks were expected to maintain 
a leverage ratio in excess of 3%, calculated on the basis of the Tier I capital i.e. common shares and retained 
earnings, dividing it by the bank’s average total consolidated assets. The new leverage ratio will provide a safety net 
to ensure RWA calculations do not result in excessively large balance sheets. Basel III is the first to introduce a 
leverage ratio as an additional minimum requirement. It is low enough to protect against a situation where banks 
held large quantities of seemingly low-risk assets which later proved to carry higher risks e.g. sovereign debt of 
EMU countries that have a risk-weighting of zero when acquired. The liquidity requirements include holding enough 
high-quality assets to cover the bank’s total net cash outflows over 30 days. Liquidity requirements were not 
included in the previous versions of Basel Accord, so this is a new area. Basel III was criticised by large European 
and American banks arguing that its implementation would decrease annual GDP growth. 
2.2. The „Too-Big-to-Fail” issue  
Addressing the „too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) issue within the financial sector reform means the resolution framework 
for systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) and more intensive supervisory oversight. It is the concept 
that when a large firm fails, losses or disruptions could be severe enough to lead to failure of third parties. The topic 
was highlighted when several large financial firms nearly collapsed in 2008. The problem is rather the fact that 
financial institutions are too interconnected to fail. The „interconnectedness” among financial institutions is 
measured by the ratio of interbank assets, liabilities and wholesale funding as a proportion of the total respective 
figures in each firm. Concentration in banking sectors has increased following the crisis largely due to mergers of 
disrupted banks with sound ones or the nationalisation of ailing institutions. In addition when less distressed banks 
managed to sell off riskier components of their balance sheet to meet minimum capital requirements, these assets 
were acquired by larges institutions thus increasing the risk and moral hazard represented by TBTF. It is not the 
sheer size of an institution that causes contagion, but that most key market activity flows through them. Preventing 
TBTF banks from failing might be necessary for maintaining the stability of the financial system in the short run. 
Bailing out TBTFs, however, is likely to lead to a less stable financial system in the long run due to moral hazard. 
Moral hazard in their case refers to their taking greater risks than without knowing they are protected from the 
negative effects of those risks. Objection to rescuing TBTF firms is not only a moral issue but from economic aspect, 
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institutions with inefficient uses of resources - and the ailing ones are such - must be punished instead of being 
rewarded.  
2.3. Regulating the shadow banking system 
The shadow banking system comprise non-bank financial intermediaries that pursue banking activities, provide 
services similar to that of banks in a way that they remain outside or only loosely linked to the regulated system of 
traditional, deposit taking institutions. It includes among others intermediaries such as hedge funds, money market 
funds, private equity funds, structured investment vehicles, securities broker dealers. The volume of their 
transactions has grown drastically since 2000. They do not take deposits and have no access to central bank funding 
or debt guarantees. Their activities include short-term funding on asset-backed commercial paper, providing cash 
loans against collateral as security or long term loans like mortgages or supplying loans to a wide range of borrowers 
who might otherwise be not eligible owing to less risk aversion of the system. Being much less regulated than their 
traditional counterparts they can leverage up, which can result in risk accumulating in the financial system. Their 
collateralised funding can easily result in high levels of leverage, which is the means of multiplying and spreading 
risk, magnifying losses in declining periods and exaggerating profits in booms. Shadow banks can contribute to 
increasing systemic risk indirectly as well through interconnectedness, which means that problems arising in these 
unregulated institutions can spread to the traditional, regulated banking system. What makes these entities 
particularly vulnerable is that they borrow short-term in liquid markets and purchase long-term, illiquid and risky 
assets, like mortgage-backed securities. The value of these assets declined sharply as housing prices fell and 
foreclosures went up in the period between 2007 and 2009. With liabilities short term and assets long term and 
illiquid these institutions are subject to market risk, credit risk and liquidity risk as well. Without the support of their 
central bank as lender of last resort they are unable to refinance their short term liabilities. When it comes to paying 
off their debts they have to sell their long-term assets at depressed prices. Therefore the shadow banking system is 
blamed for significantly contributing to the global financial crisis of 2007-2012 (Harvey, 2010). The shadow 
banking system also pursues a great amount of trading activity in the OTC (over-the-counter) derivatives market in 
which trade can occur without activity being visible on any exchange. 
2.4. OTC derivatives 
Derivatives are financial contracts that derive their value from the performance of the underlying asset, the most 
common of which contain commodities, stocks, bonds, interest rates, currencies or other. Derivative contracts have 
two groups: Over-the counter (OTC) derivatives and exchange-traded derivatives (ETD). OTC derivatives are 
contracts that are traded without going through an exchange or other intermediary, while ETD derivatives are traded 
via specialised derivatives exchanges. Positions in the OTC derivatives market reached the amount of US$ 708 
trillion in 2011 comprising interest rate contracts (67 per cent), credit default swaps (8 per cent), foreign exchange 
contracts (9 per cent), commodity contracts (2 per cent), equity contracts (1 per cent), other type of contracts (12 per 
cent) (BIS Survey, 2011). Since OTC derivatives are not traded on an exchange, there are no central counterparties 
(CCPs). As a part of the financial sector reform, non-cleared OTC transactions are to be shifted to central 
counterparties (CCPs). The transition to CCPs would result in better risk management and resiliency in accordance 
with giving more transparency to the OTC market. The risk of derivatives stem from using leverage meaning that 
investors can earn large returns from minor changes in the underlying asset’s price. On the other hand, however, they 
can suffer massive losses in case of opposite moves in price. Derivatives contracts, which were regarded as a bet on 
the price of something, except for ones for hedging purposes were made unenforceable according to the Gaming Act 
1845 (8 & 9 Vict.c.109) of the United Kingdom, which made gaming houses illegal similarly to the legislation in 
Australia and the United States (Buckley, 2012). From the 1980s derivatives began to be removed from the 
application of these laws, mainly because sophisticated players were expected to be able to protect themselves, 
which did not prove right in the crisis.  
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2.5. The rise in algorithmic and high frequency trading 
Algorithmic or computer-driven trading accounted for approximately 70 per cent of US equity trading and 
between 30 and 40 per cent of European and Japanese equity trading in 2009 (Aite Group Survey). It means using 
electronic platforms for entering trading orders the instructions of which are executed by algorithms. „High- 
frequency trading” (HFT) is a special class of algorithmic trading. Decisions to initiate orders are based on 
electronically received information capitalising on time difference between computers and human traders in 
processing the information. It can be used in investment strategies such as market making which benefits from the 
bid-ask spread, arbitrage or trend following. Concerns imply lacking traders’ intuitive senses, being too fast to be 
corrected or generating huge waves of selling, which led to the case of Flash Crash in 2010. 1 
3. Discussion 
3.1. The Financial Stability Board and its role in implementing financial regulation 
The Financial Stability Board (FSB) working through its members is committed to maintaining financial stability 
and the transparency of the financial sector. Having been transformed from the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) by 
the G-20 on their London summit in 2009 it has pursued a wide range of reforms. The Financial Stability Forum 
founded in 1999 initially consisted of the finance ministers and the central bankers of G-72 economies besides 
international financial bodies aimed to promote international financial stability. Prior to their meetings the Financial 
Stability Board provides a status report to G-20 leaders the priority issue of which has been the reform of financial 
regulation. As a coordinator for standard setting bodies it focuses on economic and financial standards which set out 
widely accepted good practices, principles or guidelines in given fields such as Macroeconomic Policy, Data 
Transparency, Financial Regulation and Supervision and Institutional and Market Infrastructure. The FSB has 
effectively become an instrument of the G-20 to shape detailed actions, put the agreements into practice and oversee 
implementation. It has played an important role in translating political will into agreements on regulatory measures. 
Due to the globalised financial markets in which one failure can bring down the entire system intensive international 
cooperation among regulators is indispensable. As for the implementation there are some countries for instance US 
and Canada in which it has been good while it has been lagging behind in some other, meaning that it is regarded as 
a weaker area within the G-20 (Lipton, 2012) despite the FSB adopted peer review as a part of the enforcement 
mechanism since regulation and supervision remains a national competence. National regulators and supervisors are 
assessed by their counterparts from other countries because it is important to ensure that agreements on the 
international level are translated to national legislation and implemented by supervisors equitably. Owing to the 
reform agenda the range of institutions covered by the supervisory net has risen significantly containing not only 
banks and insurance companies but hedge funds and other kinds of „shadow banking” as well let alone institutions 
like credit rating agencies reducing reliance on them. The range of instruments under detailed regulation has grown, 
particularly for asset-backed securities and OTC derivatives. The level of detail concerning capital requirements, 
liquidity, leverage and economic and financial standards has increased. Supervision processes have been 
strengthened with special regard of the resolution framework for the systemically important financial institutions. 
The behaviour of financial institutions is to be regulated through guidelines on compensation and corporate 
governance for instance. 
 
 
1 Flash Crash: On May 6 2010 there was a US Stock market crash in which Dow Jones Industrial Average plunged 1000 points partly due to high 
frequency traders’ aggressive selling contributing to the sharp price declines that day 
2 G7 economies included US, UK, France, Japan, Canada, Germany and Italy 
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3.2. The fundamental changes in the international financial system and the reform agenda 
Buckley argues that while all the reforms of the agenda are worthwhile it is more important to examine whether 
they addressed the fundamental changes in the financial system starting in the 1970s. The financial system won’t get 
stable until the changes are addressed adequately. The profound changes of the system include the globalisation of 
the international financial system with unblocked capital flows and IT solutions, which made the capital markets the 
most globalised ones. The current system of financial regulation with its institutions such as the Basel Committee, 
FSB, BIS3 is a soft-law response to the absence of a global financial regulator (Brummer, 2011). Research shows 
that rise in algorithmic and high frequency trading tends to make exchange rates and stock and commodity prices 
diverge from those reflecting economic fundamentals creating baseless trends and leading to price distortions, which 
fosters higher levels of trading through preferring short term speculators (Schulmeister, 2010). The removal of 
derivatives from the scope of gaming laws4 means the legalisation of financial gambling. Enjoying special legal 
exemptions the derivatives became an attractive legal form of extending credit. The global financial crisis showed 
that financial market participants were unable to protect their own interests although they had been supposed to. 
Having a large notional value the derivatives carry the risk that their use can result in uncompensable losses for the 
investor. The chain reaction triggered can contribute to a crisis. Warren Buffet called the derivatives „financial 
weapons of mass destruction” (Berkshire Hathaway Annual Report for 2002). The change in banks and bankers 
compared with the ones in the 1980s is also remarkable. In contrast with intermediating only money banks today 
derive their income rather from speculating on markets or trading in „exotic securities” or non-conventional financial 
products meaning that much of the business of a contemporary bank would have been illegal in 1970 (Buckley, 
2012). Banker remuneration curbs which are represented in the reform agenda in the European Union is likely to 
change banker behaviour in terms of their risk taking with regard of the asset value they have created or acquired.  
3.3. Other reforms to handle the changes in the financial system 
Imposing levies5 on banks’ assets by their governments recommended by the IMF is a means of accumulating 
funds for possible future bailouts so that they will be funded by the financial institutions rather than the taxpayers, or 
reducing the size of the sector which has grown too large or profitable. Introducing the financial transaction tax was 
proposed by James Tobin, a Nobel laureate economist in 1970 to put sales taxes on currency trades across borders. 
According to Tobin such a tax would tame purely speculative, hot money dissuading short-term transactions. The 
European Union voted to allow 11 countries to implement a financial transaction tax by 20146 on trades of shares 
and bonds at a rate of 0.1 and on derivatives on shares and bonds at a rate of 0.01 per cent with the tax base of the 
nominal value of the underlying assets (Inman, 2013). Considering the feasibility of the tax in 2011 the IMF 
concluded that it is not more difficult to administer than any other taxes. The proposed tax will be levied according 
to the fiscal residence of the seller of an asset (Brondolo, 2011). The use of the tax may contribute to simplifying the 
transactions thus making regulations more effective, which is in line with the aim of the Financial Stability Board of 
encouraging accuracy in pricing. Despite the reasonable argument for the transaction tax i.e. trade should be 
conducted more on the basis of economics than speculators' belief on asset prices there is an extensive and vigorous 
debate on FTT in Europe. In the US the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act enacted by 
the 111th United States Congress in July 21 2010 requires regulators to take a series of actions in order to create 
financial stability through regulating. As for the derivatives the Act aims to move trade away from bilateral 
counterparty agreements into central clearinghouses to make standardised types of derivatives to be exchange-traded 
and centrally cleared. Section 619 of the Act prohibits depository banks to acquire or hold an interest in a hedge fund 
 
 
3  Bank for International Settlements 
4  Derivatives began to be exempted from the application of gaming laws from the 1980s. One was the Gaming Act 1845 in the United Kingdom, 
which made gaming houses illegal and gaming contracts unenforceable. Apart from derivatives contracts for hedging purposes those that placed a 
bet on the price of something were unenforceable. 
5 Levies were imposed in France, Germany and the UK in 2011 
6 Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain 
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or in a private equity fund and to engage in proprietary trading with the exception of risk-mitigating hedging or 
trading in government securities.7 These provisions apply to proprietary trading and fund activities by US banks and 
their affiliates in any location. The intense lobbying of the special interest groups of the financial services industry 
has achieved that the Volcker rule has been made too complex to apply effectively and that the rule has been made 
less forceful.  
3.4. An early assessment of the reforms 
The main goals of the comprehensive regulatory program were to make the global financial system more resilient 
to shocks, provide protection to consumers and taxpayers and enhance the preparedness of institutions when it comes 
to facing potential shocks. According to the Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) there have been 
improvements in implementing the reforms and the post-crisis reform agenda has been going to the right direction 
there are still some fields that deserve more attention (IMF, 2012). Although some market-based intermediation 
shows a decline the general level of non-traditional banking activity has remained relatively unaffected (IMF, 2010). 
This relates to the advanced economies since in emerging economies it has not played a significant role in 
contributing the revenue of the financial institutions. There has been a fall in demand for securitised products such as 
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), over the counter derivatives (OTC) or mortgage backed securities (MBS) and 
the issuance of corporate bonds has increased to offset that. The concentration in banking sectors has increased 
mostly due to mergers of ailing banks with stronger ones and nationalisation of distressed financial institutions. In 
many cases riskier assets sold by institutions in order to meet minimum capital requirements were acquired by larger 
sector players exacerbating the risk. The level of interconnectedness among financial institutions has remained 
relatively unchanged. Assets are concentrated with strong inter-bank linkages. Based on data analysis drawn from 
forty-five countries representing advanced economies within the OECD and the largest economies in CEE, Asia and 
Latin America the IMF made a number of financial indices to test for a relationship between progress toward 
normative benchmarks and each country's level of implementation of standards approved by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision. According to the econometric analysis there is tentative but statistically significant 
relationship between implementation of previous Committee regulatory measures and the likelihood that liability 
structures and securisation activity of banks have been changed (Kodres, 2012). As assessed in the GFSR financial 
systems are still complex, the "too-big-to-fail" issues have remained unresolved and more innovative products have 
been developed to avoid new regulation whereas bringing shadow banking into the regulatory net is underway. The 
processes around supervision have been strengthened particularly for systemically important financial institutions. 
Asset-backed securities and OTC derivatives have been drawn under detailed regulation and if the reforms are fully 
implemented they are likely to lead to a more stable, traditional banking. The increased cooperation between 
regulators encourages addressing the issues within the Coordination Framework set up by the Financial Stability 
Board with the objectives of enhancing regulatory certainty and reducing inconsistent regulation. Yet there are still 
some trends that signal the special difficulties of this unprecedented reform program. When implementing domestic 
regulations with extraterritorial impacts jurisdictions may face compliance difficulties. The Volcker rule in Dodd-
Frank Act of the US is typically such. Adjusting the content, the timing or the implementation approach jurisdictions 
may cause inconsistency and affect the financial services and the functioning of markets adversely. Inconsistent 
local implementation may result in regulatory fragmentation. This process could jeopardize global financial 
integration through less efficient intermediation of savings and would reduce resilience of the system (Carney, 
2013). In the Global Financial Stability Report the IMF raises an important question on the trade-off between the 
safety of financial systems and economic growth. It is essential to explore how the changes in financial structures 
impact economic outcomes. Considering the major regulatory fields Basel III with its higher capital requirements 
will result in increasing cost for the banks. Non-banks are not facing these requirements, which will improve their 
competitiveness in activities in which they are competitors to them. The Dodd-Frank Act of the US that tightens the 
derivatives regulations will increase bank costs, and low-margin standardised revenue sources will dominate shifting 
 
 
7 These provisions are commonly referred to as the Volcker rule after former chairman of the Fed, Paul Volcker  
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the derivative business to different non-bank financial institutions. The Volcker rule of the Act that eliminates 
proprietary trading is likely to result in some business' forcing out of the banks. Capital markets seem to benefit from 
these changes. The capital, liquidity and derivatives reforms and the effects of higher taxes and fees impact cost of 
credit but are essential and provide large benefits to society. Financial crises and recessions incur huge economic 
costs. Financial stability depends on how effectively the regulators monitor, prevent and address systemic risk. The 
global financial crisis evidenced that financial regulation before the GFC proved insufficient to maintain the 
stability. The G-20 plays the leading role in coordinating responses and financial regulatory reforms and has been 
quite effective in creating, implementing its regulatory agenda and overseeing implementation.  
Conclusions 
The regulatory framework does not imply abandoning financial globalisation. Transparency and clarity in risk-
profit trade-off contributes to economic growth. Banks in the world will adapt to the regulatory changes. In the long 
run the benefits of a safer, more resilient financial system will outweigh the costs that regulatory reform may incur. 
Besides effective domestic and regional monetary policies cross-border resolution mechanisms have to be 
established bearing consumer protection as well as crisis prevention on mind. Clear consensus seems to have been 
achieved on more transparency, monitoring financial innovation and advance contingency planning particularly in 
case of systemic cross-border financial institutions. Increased capital adequacy requirements, prudent assessment of 
innovative financial products, sound financial institutional framework as well as proper risk management will 
contribute to establishing a solid structure of the global financial architecture. 
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